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PROviSIONAL REMEDES-CLAIM AND DELmY-Pio=rY OF LmN
ACQUIRED SUBSEQUENT TO SEIZURE OF PROPERTY IN CLAIM AN DEvERY
AcnON.- Defendant, while a resident of Michigan, mortgaged his
automobile to plaintiff. He came to Kentucky, mailed plaintiff three
monthly payments from a Kentucky address, and then defaulted on
the mortgage. The mortgage was recorded only in Michigan. Plain-
tiff brought a claim and delivery action for the automobile. Upon
seizure by the sheriff, defendant executed bond to plaintiff and the
automobile was restored to him. While the action was pending and
the defendant had possession by virtue of the bond, the automobile
was damaged and defendant took it to a mechanic who repaired it.
The mechanic intervened in the claim and delivery action and as-
serted his mechanic's lien, claiming that this lien was superior to
plaintiff's rights in the property. The trial court held that the mechan-
ic's lien was superior. Held: Reversed. Seizure by the sheriff placed
the automobile in the legal custody of the court. The bond gave
defendant only a bare right of possession, subject to the legal posses-
sion and control of the court. He "did not have the power to incur
a lien against the automobile that could take precedence over the
claim of the plaintiff in the action in which the automobile had been
seized."' Manufacturer National Bank of Detroit v. Greenwade, 329
S.W.2d 586 (Ky. 1959).
This appears to be the first Kentucky case considering, in a claim
and delivery action, the priorities between the holder of a lien in-
curred or suffered by the defendant after possession has been restored
to him on giving bond and the plaintiff who has an executed order of
delivery. However, similar questions have arisen with respect to
property that had been attached and thereafter returned to the
defendant because he had executed bond to the plaintiff. The Ken-
tucky court in the principal case said that the reasoning of the at-
tachment cases was applicable to a claim and delivery case and in a
brief opinion held that the claim of the plaintiff was superior to any
lien acquired while the defendant was in possession by reason of
his bond.
Although the court might be correct in holding that plaintiffs
claim to the automobile was superior to the mechanic's lien, it is
doubtful whether the court used the proper basis for its decision.
The nature of attachment and claim and delivery are so different
that it is difficult to see how the reasoning of one could validly be
transferred to the other.
Claim and delivery is a statutory substitute for the common-law
'Manufacturers Nat'l Bank of Detroit v. Greenwade, 829 S.W.2d 586, 587
(Ky. 1959).
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action of replevin.2 Through such an action, a plaintiff may recover
the possession of specific personal property at the commencement
of the action, or at any time before judgment,3 unless the defendant
or the one having possession of the property executes bond to the
plaintiff.4 In order for a plaintiff to obtain possession he must file a
proper affidavit with the clerk,5 who then addresses and delivers to
the sheriff an order of delivery.6 The sheriff executes this order by
seizing the property.7 If the defendant does not execute bond to the
plaintiff within two days, the sheriff must deliver the property to
planitiff.8 Thus, the bond which permits the defendant to retain the
property is a substitute for the immediate possession to which the
plaintiff would otherwise be entitled. The same is not true in the
case of attached property.
Attachment is a provisional remedy through which plaintiff has
the sheriff seize a portion of defendant's property at the commence-
ment of the action in order to insure its availability for the satisfac-
tion of the money judgment the plaintiff is seeking.9 If, after seizure
of personal property the defendant does not execute bond to plain-
tiff, possession remains in the sheriff, subject to order of the court.10
There are two bonds by which a defendant may recover posses-
sion of personal property that has been seized pursuant to an order
of attachment. One is commonly called a "forthcoming" bond. By
such bond the defendant covenants to the plaintiff that he will "per-
form the judgment of the court... or that the property or its value
shall be forthcoming and subject to the order of the court.""'
If the defendant wants possession of the property, and does not
wish to execute a forthcoming bond, he may have the attachment
discharged by executing a bond to plaintiff to the effect that he will
perform the judgment of the court.' 2 It can readily be seen that
the effect of a forthcoming bond is to insure that the property or its
value will be available for execution, whereas a bond to discharge
the attachment is a judgment bond. The effect of these bonds was
discussed by the Court of Appeals in Hudson Engineering Co. v.
Shaw:'3
2 See Ky. Rev. Stat. (hereinafter referred to as KRS) § 425.120-.180 (1959).
3KRS §425.120 (1959).
4KRS § 425.155 (1959).
5 See KRS § 425.125 (1959).
6 KRS § 425.145 (1959).
7KRS § 425.145 (1959).sKRS § 425.155 (1959).
9 See KRS § 425.185.
10 See KRS §§ 425.225(2), 280, 305 (1959).
11KRS § 425.280(1) (1959).
12 KRS § 425.305(1) (1959).
13 167 Ky. 27, 179 S.W. 1083 (1915).
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[A forthcoming bond] is a mere obligation for the forthcoming of the
property; the lien created by the attachment, and the power of the
court over the attached property, subsist and continue as effectually
as if no bond had been given, or the possession never taken out of
the hands of the officer; and continues until final judgment is rend-
ered disposing of the attachment ..... On the other hand, where ...
[a bond to discharge the attachment is executed], all power of the
court and its officers over the attached property ceases, and plaintiff
can look only to the bond.14
The "reasoning of the attachment cases" on which the court based
its decision in the instant case is clearly expressed in the above quota-
tion. Attached property in defendant's possession by reason of his
forthcoming bond is still subject to the control of the court and can-
not be encumbered with a lien superior to that of the attaching plain-
tiff. While this reasoning may be valid when applied to attached
property, it is difficult to see how it has anything to do with the
automobile in the present case. If the defendant had not executed
bond, the plaintiff, not the sheriff or the court, would have had pos-
session. The control of the automobile would have been in the plain-
tiff rather than the court. Thus, it seems that the court was on ten-
uous ground when it based its decision in this case on the "reason-
ing of the attachment cases."
A more reasonable basis for deciding that plaintiff's. claim was
superior to the mechanic's lien would have been to hold that either
the filing of the action 5 or the seizure of the property gave notice
of plaintiff's interest in the property and that subsequent to this notice
no lien effective against whatever interest the plaintiff might have
could be incurred or suffered by defendant. The existence and effect
of the mechanic's lien might depend upon the outcome of the claim
and delivery action,16 but the lien would still be subordinate to any
interest of the plaintiff of which there was notice.
Despite the fact that the mechanic's lien was inferior to plain-
tiff's interest in the automobile, the repairman probably had grounds
for relief. If the automobile had not been repaired, plaintiff would
have had to rely upon the bond for the loss in value. He probably
could have taken the damaged automobile and looked to the bond
for the losses occasioned by the damage,lt or he could have refused
17 There does not seem to be any specific authority sanctioning this election,
but it should be available if the plaintiff so chose, for the bondsman would not
complain, and the defendant would have no grounds to complain.
'4 Id. at 33, 179 S.W. at 1085.
15 This would be common law lis pendens, which apparently is still in effect
in Kentucky. See P. A. Stark Piano Co. v. Fannin, 212 Ky. 640, 279 S.W. 1080
(1926).
16 if the defendant prevailed, or if plaintiff's interest was less than the value
of the automobile, the lien would be effective to the extent of any interest the
defendant might have.
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the property and looked to the bond for the assessed value of the
automobile at the time it was seized.'8 In either case the defendant
or his bondsman would be responsible for the loss in value due to
the damage, and since defendant evidently is insolvent, the bonds-
man would be responsible. If defendant is insolvent and if the
mechanic does not have an effective lien because of the priority of
plaintiff's claim, the bondsman has been unjustly enriched at the ex-
pense of the mechanic. Thus it seems there were adequate grounds
for an action in quasi-contract 9 or in equity.
20
Both the intervening mechanic and the court 2' appear to have
misunderstood the law of this case. The mechanic misconstrued his
remedy and attempted to enforce a lien, instead of relying on quasi-
contract or his equitable remedy. The court used the wrong basis
for its decision that the plaintiff's interest was superior to the mechan-
ics lien. If a similar case were to arise in the future, a mechanic should
not be hampered by this decision, for as long as he does not miscon-
strue his remedy and attempt to rely upon his lien, the question of
priority of claims will not arise, and the present case will be irrele-
vant. However, if the question of priority should arise again, the court
should acknowledge the mistake made in this case and place the
decision on a sound basis of law.
Carl R. Clontz
Toxts-CoNmwuTroRY NEGLiGENcE:-EFFEcr OF TE VIOLrTON OF A
STATuTE BY AN EiGHT-YEAR-OLD Cim.- Plaintiff brought suit to re-
cover damages for injuries sustained by his eight-year-old and five-
year-old sons who were struck by defendant's automobile as they
were crossing a street where there was no crosswalk. The eight-year-
18KRS § 426.300 (1959).
19 Since "the law implies a promise where the party ought to promise," the
bondsman might be liable on an implied contract. See Goodall v. Warden's
Adrn'r, 280 Ky. 632, 133 S.W.2d 944 (1939); see also, Fayette Tob. Whse.'Co.
v. Lexington Tob. Bd. of Trade, 299 S.W.2d 640 (Ky. 1957); Kellum v. Brown-
ing's Adm'r, 231 Ky. 308, 21 S.W.2d 459 (1929).
20 One theory would be equitable subrogation. Since the bondsman would
have been liable to the plaintiff for the damages to the automobile, the mechanic
has in effect "paid" the debt of the bondsman. Since he was not a volunteer,
the mechanic, to prevent unjust enrichment, should be subrogated to the plain-
tiff's rights against the bondsman. See Chapman v. Blackburn, 295 Ky. 606, 175
S.W.2d 26 (1943); McCracken County v. Lakeview Country Club, 254 Ky.
515, 70 S.W.2d 938 (1934).
21 The plaintiff also failed, for the court pointed out in the opinion that
the briefs only argued the question of whether the plaintiff was required to
record its mortgage in Kentucky in order to preserve its interest against third
parties.
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